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Abstract. Recent experimental studies nd excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission
games with con
ictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in
sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention
signicantly increases the excessive trust of receivers.
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1 Introduction
In their seminal work, Crawford and Sobel (1982) introduce and study strategic information trans-
mission between two parties who have aligned or con
ictive interests.1 They assume that a better
informed party (sender) transmits a non-veriable and costless message to the other party (receiver)
who then takes a payo relevant action. Their results show that (i) as the (noncon
ictive) interests
of the two parties become less aligned, less information is transmitted, and (ii) if interests of the two
parties diverge even by an arbitrarily small amount, no information is transmitted.
Corresponding Author: Fax: +(90) 312 292 4213.
E-mail addresses: mygurdal@etu.edu.tr (M.Y. Gurdal), aozdogan@etu.edu.tr (A. Ozdogan), is-
mail.saglam@etu.edu.tr (I. Saglam).
1Among many economic environments, information exchange in Cournot duopolies (Novshek and Sonnenschein,
1982), legislative relationships between committees and 
oors (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987), grade in
ation and letters
of recommendation for the promotion of college graduates (Rosovsky and Hartley, 2002), communication between biased
securities analysts and investors (Blanes i Vidal, 2003), doctor-patient relationships (K  oszegi, 2006) are some studied
examples that allow for incentives for strategic information transmission.
1Of the two theoretical predictions of Crawford and Sobel (1982), prediction (i) is supported by
Dickhaut et al. (1995) in their pioneering experimental paper on strategic information transmission,
and later by Cai and Wang (2006), who also show that senders are more truthful whereas receivers
are more trustful than what the theory predicts in the most informative sequential equilibrium. Cai
and Wang (2006) explain this overcommunication phenomenon using a behavior type analysis (see for
example Stahl and Williams, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; and Crawford, 2003
among others) and quantal response equilibrium concept (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998).
A recent strand of experimental literature studies the second theoretical prediction of Crawford
and Sobel (1982). As such, Gneezy (2005) shows that in a sender game where the preferences are
con
ictive but only the sender knows the payo structure, the probability of lying is higher, the higher
is the resulting gain to the sender or the lower is the resulting loss to the receiver. S anchez-Pag es
and Vorsatz (2007) consider a sender-receiver game where the sender who observes the true state
of the world can choose to tell the truth or to lie whereas the receiver can trust or distrust. They
establish in their baseline game that when preferences are con
ictive but not too unequal, senders
tell the truth signicantly more frequently than predicted by the cheap-talk equilibrium consistent
with purely material incentives. To understand the non-material roots underlying this phenomenon,
S anchez-Pag es and Vorsatz (2007) design a punishment game which permits the receiver to costly
punish the sender once the outcome of the baseline game is observed. Thus they are able to show that
excessive truth-telling in the baseline game can be explained in terms of normative social behavior. In
a similar setup, S anchez-Pag es and Vorsatz (2009) further show that when the sender is also allowed
to choose a costly option of remaining silent, excessive truth-telling observed in the benchmark game
can be attributed to lying aversion. Peeters et al. (2008) deal with the same phenomenon of excessive
truth-telling from a dierent angle again with the help of two related games. While a baseline game
is designed as similarly to those in S anchez-Pag es and Vorsatz (2007, 2009), a reward game allows the
receiver to give a reward of a xed amount to the sender once the baseline game was played and the
histories were observed by the players. Peeters et al. (2008) nd that in the baseline game senders
tell the truth signicantly more often than, whereas receivers trust almost as often as, predicted by
the theory. Moreover, the excessive truth-telling disappears under the rewarding environment, while
the trust frequency increases signicantly.
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the above literature, dealing with prediction (ii) of Crawford
and Sobel (1982), by studying the robustness of excessive truth-telling phenomenon with respect to
the random intervention of a truthful regulator in situations where the transfer of strategic information
is under some degree of control. This modied game with the random intervention of a regulator is
2equivalent to a behavioral game in which a sender can be of either a strategic (standard rational)
type or a behavioral (honest) type, with the probability distribution over the types being common
knowledge.2 An example of sender-receiver games involving a mix of behavioral and nonbehavioral
types can be potentially found in currency exchange markets of emerging economies with current
account problems. The objectives of a central bank (the sender) in such an economy may involve to
strongly intervene in the forex market if the publicly known probability of the out
ow of hot money is
suciently high and to weakly intervene, only to dampen the volatility of exchange rates, otherwise. In
the rst situation, the central bank may choose to act nonstrategically while in the second situation it
may strategically transmit information to the public or investors (the receiver) to ensure that exchange
rates move in the opposite direction of the public's expectations.
Obviously, in sender-receiver games the awareness of intervention (or the presence of behavioral,
in addition to conventionally studied strategic, type of senders) can induce an increased level of trust
among those who are on the receiving side. At the same time, strategic senders can exploit this regu-
lated situation if they adjust their actions based on the updated trust levels. So these opposing eects
make the overall eect of intervention unclear. When a regulatory authority occasionally intervenes
forcing the submitted messages to be truthful (or when some of the senders behave nonstrategically),
how are the overall frequencies of truth-telling and trust aected? Motivated with this question, in
this paper we study experimentally the behavior of subjects in a sender-receiver game under regulatory
intervention and under no intervention. As usual, we will consider two games corresponding to these
two situations.
Our Benchmark Game is identical to the sender-receiver games in S anches-Pag es and Vorsatz
(2007, 2009) and Peeters et al. (2008). In particular, the sender observes Nature's realization of a
payo table that could be of two equally likely types, over which the sender and the receiver have
opposing interests. Each table involves two outcomes corresponding to two actions of a receiver. After
Nature's choice of a table type, the sender submits a message, consisting of the type of the actual payo
table, to the receiver who is entirely uninformed about Nature's choice. Because of this informational
2In this regard, our experimental paper is closely related to the theoretical model of Landi and Colucci (2008), where
there is uncertainty about both sender's and receiver's types. In that model, each player belongs to a family of either a
sophisticated type (the standard rational type) or a mortal (behavioral) type, where mortal types are `truth tellers' and
`liars' for senders, and `believers' and `inverters' (of the actions implicitly suggested by senders' messages) for receivers.
Another related work is by Ottaviani and Squintani (2002), who study the information transmission in sender-receiver
games under the possibility that the sender or the receiver is non-strategic. Their ndings establish that the presence
of behavioral types in the model leads to in
ation in the equilibrium communication in contrast to the predictions of
conventional models with nonbehavioral types.
3asymmetry, the sender can choose to lie whenever she nds it optimal. After observing the message
of the sender, the receiver takes an action by trusting or distrusting the sender, and consequently the
payos of the two players are determined by the actual state chosen by Nature and the action taken
by the receiver.
In the alternative environment, namely the Regulated Game, the sequence of actions are the same
as in the Benchmark Game, yet there is now a regulator which truthfully submits to the receiver
Nature's choice of payo table with commonly known probability  2 (0;1=2).3 Thus, a message
about Nature's choice can be submitted by a strategic sender only with probability 1    2 (1=2;1).
Behavior predicted in all sequential equilibria of both the Benchmark and the Regulated Game
implies that receivers never receive any relevant information. In the Benchmark Game the sender, who
is always strategic, achieves this by submitting an untruthful message with probability one-half (due
to the symmetric construction of the constant-sum payo tables with respect to players and actions).
In the Regulated Game, a strategic sender can submit message only with probability 1  ; therefore,
she can achieve the non-informativeness of the message that the receiver will observe, by lying with
probability 0:5=(1   ) whenever she is to submit any message. The receiver, anticipating that any
communication he receives is only cheap-talk, chooses in both games each of his two actions with
probability one-half so as to maximize his expected payos given the prior probabilities on the states
chosen by Nature.4
We conduct our experiments in the Regulated Game when senders are behavioral with probability
0.3. The sequential equilibrium predicts both truth-telling and trust with probability one-half for
the Benchmark Game (Corollary 1 to Proposition 1) whereas truth-telling of strategic senders with
probability 2/7 (28.6%) and trust with probability 1/2 for the Regulated Game (Corollaries 2 and
3 to Proposition 2). However, our results show that in the Benchmark Game senders tell the truth
around 56% of the time while receivers trust 53% of the time. The observed excessive truth-telling
and excessive trust are much higher for the Regulated Game. We nd the frequency of truth-telling
of strategic senders as high as 42% (in contrast to the prediction of 28.6%). Given the prior likelihood
of strategic senders, the frequency of truthful messages the receivers get in the Regulated Game is as
high as around 60%, clearly a case against the theoretical prediction of no information transmission
by the two types of senders on average. This is, even more strikingly, despite the excessively high
frequency of trust which we nd around 61%.
3We are not interested in the case where  2 [1=2;1], since if  = 1=2 the strategic sender can use cheap talk only
by lying with certainty and if  > 1=2 the receiver would no longer nd it optimal to ignore any message he receives.
4The sequential equilibrium in the Regulated Game, which we directly prove in Appendix A, can also be obtained
as a corollary to Proposition 2 in Landi and Colucci (2008).
4Our nal analysis deals with the question why we observe an increase in excessive truth-telling and
excessive trust in the presence of a truthful regulator (a behavioral sender). In an attempt to give
a partial answer, we examine the dynamic eects of the intervention of a truthful regulator in early
periods of the experiments which are repeated for 50 period on the future levels of truth-telling and
trust. Our regressions show that the more subjects benet from telling the truth in the earlier periods
of the Regulated Game, the more likely they will send correct messages in the further periods, while
telling a lie or the truth in the future is found to be entirely random in the Benchmark Game. On
the receiver side, we nd that both the number of protable experiences of trust and the number of
observations of trust experienced by other players in the earlier periods increase the probability of the
receiver's trusting other players later in the Regulated Game while the rst one of these variables has
the opposite eect in the Benchmark Game and the second one has no signicant eect.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the model and theoretical predictions,
and in Section 3 we present the experimental design. Afterwards, we report our experimental results,
and nally, we conclude in Section 5. (Proofs and the instructions corresponding to the experimental
games are in the Appendix.)
2 Model and Theoretical Predictions
In this section, we introduce the Benchmark and the Regulated Game; and then present the theoretical
predictions. The Benchmark Game is a standard sender-receiver game (also studied by S anches-Pag es
and Vorsatz, 2007, 2009; and Peeters et al., 2008) with con
icting-interests, in which the sender
privately learns the actual payo table picked by Nature and is able to reveal this information to the
receiver truthfully or not. Then the receiver, without learning the actual payo table, takes an action
that determines the payos for each player given the actual table that was chosen by Nature. In the
Regulated Game, on the other hand, with some probability, the strategic sender is not allowed to take
any action while the regulator (the behavioral sender) intervenes and reveals her private information
truthfully to the receiver. The receiver, without knowing if the sender is restricted to tell the truth
or not, takes an action given the information communicated by the sender, which determines the nal
payos (in the actual payo table) for both players.
Below, we formally present these two games with their equilibrium predictions.
52.1 Benchmark Game
We denote the sender and the receiver by S and R, respectively. At the beginning of the game, Nature
chooses a payo table A or B with equal probability, i.e. p(A) = p(B) = 1=2, which determines the
nal payos of the players. The sender is privately informed about the realized payo table. After the
sender learns the actual payo table, she sends a message S (possibly a mixed strategy) from the set
of possible messages M = fA;Bg. For instance, S(A j B) denotes the probability of sending message
A after learning that the actual payo table is B. The receiver's strategy is choosing a (possibly
mixed) action R from the set of actions fU;Dg after observing the message submitted by the sender;
for example R(U j A) denotes the probability that action U is chosen after observing that the sender
communicated message A.
The payo tables which are determined by Nature are as follows:
Table 1. Payo tables
Table A Sender Receiver
Action U x 1
Action D 1 x
Table B Sender Receiver
Action U 1 x
Action D x 1
where x > 1. The game tree that describes the Benchmark Game is given by the following gure.
Next we nd the sequential equilibria of this game. Let 1 = p(A j A) (a belief at information set
H1 in Figure 1) denote the probability that Nature chose table A given that the receiver has observed
message A; and similarly let 2 = p(A j B) (a belief at information set H2 in Figure 1) denote the
probability that Nature chose table A given that the receiver has observed message B.
Proposition 1 The set of sequential equilibria of the Benchmark Game is the set of strategies
(S(A j A);S(A j B);R(U j A);R(U j B)) = (p;p;q;q), where p;q 2 [0;1] and the supporting be-
lief system (1;2) = (1
2; 1
2).
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in S anchez-Pag es and Vorsatz (2007). Besides, our next
proposition that will characterize the sequential equilibrium in the Regulated Game will admit the
above proposition as a special case. Proposition 1 states that in equilibrium the sender does not reveal
any information and the receiver takes an action ignoring the messages submitted by the sender.5
From the same proposition, we should also notice that:
5Although there are many sequential equilibria in the characterization of Proposition 1, one can assume that ex-
perimental subjects select some equilibria more often than the others. S anchez-Pag es and Vorsatz (2007) present the
Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium (AQRE) of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) and nd the unique logit-AQRE
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Figure 1: The Benchmark Game
Corollary 1 In the Benchmark Game, the probability of sending an untruthful message by the sender
is 1=2. Similarly, the probability of expecting an untruthful message by the receiver is 1=2.
Proof. Omitted as it is straightforward. 
2.2 Regulated Game
In the Regulated Game, with some known probability  2 (0;1), the strategic sender is
not allowed to send any message. The game tree is illustrated in Figure 2. Here, 1 =
p(actual table is A and sender is strategicj receiver observed message A) is a belief at information set
H1 and 2 = p(actual table is A and sender is strategicjreceiver observed message B) is a belief at
information set H2. In this second game, the receiver, while calculating his beliefs, also takes into
account the possibility that the sender is restricted to tell the truth.
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Figure 2: The Regulated Game
Proposition 2 In any sequential equilibrium of the Regulated Game, the strategies satisfy
R(U j A) = R(U j B) = p 2 [0;1];
S(B j A)   S(B j B) =

1   




with the supporting belief system 1 = 1
2   k1, where
k1 = p(actual table is A and sender is behavioral jreceiver observed message A)
=

 + (1   )[S(A j A) + S(A j B)]
:
Proof. See Appendix A. 
We notice that the above proposition admits Proposition 1 as a direct corollary, since the Regulated
Game boils down to the Benchmark Game when  = 0. Given Proposition 2, we can now derive the
equilibrium level of truth-telling.
8Corollary 2 The probability of sending an untruthful message by the strategic sender is 0:5=(1   ).
Proof. The probability of sending an untruthful message is (0:5)[S(B j A) + S(A j B)] =
(0:5)[S(B j A) + 1   S(B j B)] = 0:5=(1   ). 
We would like to point out that as  approaches 1/2, i.e., non-strategic and strategic information
transmissions become equally likely, the probability of lying of the strategic sender approaches `one'.
Now, we calculate the total probability of receiving untruthful messages.
Corollary 3 The total probability of the receiver's observing an untruthful message is 0.5.
Proof. We calculate the probability of seeing an untruthful message as
0:5(1   )[S(B j A) + S(A j B)]
= 0:5(1   )[S(B j A) + 1   S(B j B)]
= 0:5(1   )[1 +

1   
] = 0:5: 
The last corollary predicts the equilibrium behavior of the receiver to be the same in both games.
Also, note that when  = 0, we are back to the Benchmark Game, where the probability of truth-
telling is one-half. As  increases, the probability of lying by the strategic sender rises (and approaches
to 1 as  goes to 1=2). For instance, for  = 1=3, the probability of lying by the strategic sender is as
high as 5=7 (0:714). The strategic sender increases the amount of lying just to even out the expected
excessive truth-telling by the behavioral sender so that the messages receivers get do not contain any
relevant information.
The last point we would like to make is that the equilibrium behavior is independent of the value of
x a long as x > 1, i.e., there is some degree of con
icting interest between the sender and the receiver.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We conducted all experimental sessions in the Social Sciences Laboratory at TOBB University of
Economics and Technology during June 6-8, 2011. Students were invited by e-mail and they could
register online for a session they prefer, subject to availability. We ran a total of 8 sessions (each
with 12 subjects), four on the Benchmark and four on the Regulated Game. Each session involved 12
subjects, making a total of 96 subjects. We performed our experiments with the computer software
z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (2007).
9Our design is based on the setup used in S anchez-Pag es and Vorsatz (2007, 2008) and Peeters et
al. (2008). The Benchmark Game is based on a sender-receiver game where the interests of a sender
and a receiver diverge in dierent states which are equally likely to occur. The sender, being informed
about the true state, sends a signal to the receiver who is uninformed. The receiver then takes a
payo-relevant action. Dierent states are represented by dierent payo tables in Table 1, which are
named as \payo table A" and \payo table B". The variable x in payo tables A and B in Table 1
was set to 9 for all sessions, while the monetary unit for all payos was Turkish Lira (TL). In both
states, there are two available signals that the sender can choose among: \The payo table is A" or
\The payo table is B". After observing the signal the receiver is asked which payo table he thinks
is more likely to be the correct one. The receiver then chooses among two possible actions: \U" or
\D". After he chooses the action, the payos are realized accordingly and a summary of the period
is shown to both of the parties. This summary includes information about the true state, the signal
sent, the belief of the receiver, the action chosen by the receiver and the payos to both the sender
and the receiver.
In the Benchmark Game, subjects in each session played the game described above for 50 periods.
12 subjects in each session were divided into two groups of 6. The formation of the groups was
random, and the identities and the actions of group members remained anonymous. Every subject
was matched only with subjects within the same group, and with each of them she or he played 5
times as a sender and 5 times as a receiver. Thus, a subject played 25 times in both roles while the
order of the matchings and the role assignments were random.6
In the Regulated Game subjects played the same game in the same sequence, however, at each
period there was a 30% chance that the computer would stop the strategic sender from choosing a
message. In such periods of intervention, a correct signal was sent to the receiver while the strategic
sender was told that she will not have a choice over the signal and the system would send the correct
signal to the receiver. Regardless of the intervention, the receiver was given information about the
signal in the same manner. Hence, he was uninformed about the source of the signal and whether
an intervention occurred or not. There was no pre-determined arrangement for the occurrences of
intervention and these occurrences were independent across subjects and periods.
Payments were paid in private at the end of each session in each game. Each subject was paid
twice the average of his or her earnings during 50 periods plus a participation fee of 5 TL. The average
earnings of the subjects were 4.9938 TL (exactly 5 TL in the Benchmark Game and 4.9875 TL in the
6This matching protocol generates 1200 sender decisions and 1200 receiver decisions for both games. Out of 4800
period observations in total, 6 are dropped due to errors in type assignment.
10Regulated Game). At the time of the experiment, 1 TL corresponded to 0.6325 USD.
4 Results
We present in Figure 3 the histograms for truth-telling frequencies calculated by measuring the share
of the correct signals of the senders among signals initiated by themselves. In the Benchmark Game,
all signals are initiated by senders hence each sender has 25 (out of 50) chances to lie. But, in the
Regulated Game, a strategic sender could initiate the signals only when the computer did not intervene.
As can be seen from the left hand side histogram, majority of the strategic senders in the Benchmark
Game sent correct messages in around 50-60% of all observations, the average frequency being 55.5%.
Compared to them, conditional on no intervention, the strategic senders in the Regulated Game sent
correct messages (as shown in the right hand side histogram in Figure 3) less often with the average
frequency of truth-telling being 42% and one third of the population (16 out of 48) telling the truth
30% of the time or less often.
Figure 3: Truth-telling Frequencies
In Figure 4, we present the evolution of correct messages both for the Benchmark and the Regulated
Game. Note that overall truth-telling in the Regulated Game also includes the correct messages sent
through computer intervention which makes the overall percentage of truth 59.7% . For both games,
we observe that the overall percentage of correct messages seems to be oscillating around its mean.
11The theoretical predictions presented in Section 2 imply that the senders will lie or tell the truth
with equal frequencies (50%) in the Benchmark Game. As a result, the best reply for the receivers
would be disregarding the signal and choosing randomly among actions U and D. For the Regulated
Game, these predictions imply that in case of no intervention (which occurs with probability 0.7), the
strategic senders will lie with probability 0.714 (5/7 is the exact value predicted). This would make
the overall probability of an incorrect signal 0.5, leaving the receivers uninformed. Hence, the best
replies for the receivers would be the same as in the Benchmark Game.
Figure 4: Evolution of the Overall Percentage of Correct Signals
The frequency with which correct signals were sent is found to be higher than the theoretical
prediction for both games. This observation is consistent with most of the previous studies. The
frequency of truth-telling in similar benchmark (baseline) games with the same equilibrium predictions
was found to be 55.07% and 50.6% in S anchez-Pag es and Vorsatz (2007) over the last forty rounds
when x = 2 and x = 9 respectively; 53.4% in Peeters et al. (2008) when x = 6 but the lowest payo
was 2; 51.67% and 53.9% in S anchez-Pag es and Vorsatz (2009) when x = 5 for two dierent cost
specications of the model respectively.
In the Benchmark Game, we observe a probability around 55.5% of a message being correct. On
the other hand, for the Regulated Game, given the strategic sender behavior and the prior likelihood
of an intervention, the posterior probability of a message being correct is around 59.7%. In Figure
125, we present the histograms for trust frequencies in the Benchmark and the Regulated Game, by
measuring in each game the share of the signals trusted by the receivers among all signals received by
them; and in Figure 6 we present the cyclical evolution of trust frequencies in the two games.7 For the
Benchmark Game, the distribution is relatively concentrated around 50% with the mean being 53.7%.
For the Regulated Game the distribution is more scattered and the trust level is generally higher
with the mean being 61.3%. This dierence between the results in the two games is also statistically
signicant (p-value < 0.01 in a two sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
Figure 5: Trust Frequencies
The theoretical predictions imply that in both games a receiver will behave in the same way by
treating messages as cheap talk and will choose actions U and D with equal frequencies. This implies
an overall trust frequency of 50% for both games. For the Benchmark Game, the actual value of this
frequency is slightly above the predicted value. For the Regulated Game, there is a larger dierence
between the actual and the predicted frequencies of trust. For both the Benchmark and the Regulated
Game, these frequencies are signicantly dierent from the predicted value of 50% (p-values less than
0.01 in one sample test of proportions for both games).
For the Benchmark Game, the overall behavior can be summarized as the senders behaving slightly
more truthful and the receivers trusting slightly more often than predicted by the theory. For the
7The receiver is said to be trusting the sender (whether strategic or nonstrategic) if he takes the action that gives
the highest payo with respect to the table signalled by the sender.
13Regulated Game, the absolute dierences between the predicted and actual frequencies of truth-telling
and trust are much higher. The overall behavior in this game can be summarized as the senders not
fully exploiting the intervention system and the receivers trusting much more often than the predicted
values.
Figure 6: Evolution of the Percentage of Signals Trusted by the Receivers
When the rst 10 periods in which the subjects may be assumed to be learning the rules of the
games are excluded, the overall frequency of correct messages (including both deliberate truth-telling
and computer intervention) is found to be around %58.5 over the last 40 periods. This value is slightly
above the frequency observed in the Benchmark Game (56.1%) for the same time span, however the
dierence is not signicant (p-value = 0.288 in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Even though the frequency
of correct messages received is very similar in both games, the frequency of trust over the last 40
periods is much higher for the Regulated Game than for the Benchmark Game (62.7% versus 53.6%,
p-value less than 0.01 in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test). To summarize, during the last 40 periods, both
games induce similar frequencies of correct signals which is above 50%, but the overall trust level is
much higher in the Regulated Game.
We also focus on the eect of experience in earlier periods on the likelihood of truth-telling and
trust on later periods. In the case of truth-telling we look at the eects of protable truth-telling
experiences a subject accumulates in the role of a sender and truth-telling frequencies of other senders
14Table 2: Eect of Experience on Truth-Tellinga
Dependent Variable: Correct Signal
Benchmark Regulated
Protable truth-telling experience 0.025 0:106
(0.016) (0.030)
Protable truth-telling experience - normalized 0:368 0:696
(0.212) (0.208)
Observed truth-telling -0.003 0.021
(0.020) (0.017)
Observed truth-telling - normalized -0.053 -0.026
(0.264) (0.269)
Male 0.083 0.078 -0.094 -0.097
(0.075) (0.075) (0.079) 0.079
N 600 600 425 425
Prob > chi2 0.193 0.164 0.002 0.005
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.015 0.043 0.033
aThe table reports the marginal eects of the dierent variables on telling a lie and the clustered robust standard errors
are given in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% condence levels, respectively.
with whom the same subject interacts in the role of a receiver on the subject's truth-telling tendency
in later periods. Similarly, in the case of trust, we look at the eects of protable trust experiences and
the observed trust frequencies of other subjects on a subject's likelihood of trusting senders' messages
in later periods.
To this end, we conduct several logistic regression results of which are summarized in Tables 2 and
3. Below we explain these results in more detail.
Table 2: In constructing our variables, we divide each game in two halves. The dependent variable
is correct signal which is equal to 1 if a subject (as a sender) told the truth and 0 otherwise, and this
variable only includes observations from the second half of the game. Our independent variables are
15Table 3: Eect of Experience on Trustinga
Dependent Variable: Trust
Benchmark Regulated
Protable trust experience  0:028 0:057
(0.011) (0.016)
Protable trust experience - normalized  0:324 0:685
(0.134) (0.219)
Observed trust 0.002 0:036
(0.008) (0.014)
Observed trust - normalized 0.048 0.094
(0.137) (0.116)
Male 0.035 0.034 0:188 0:166
(0.046) (0.045) (0.057) 0.061
N 600 600 600 600
Prob > chi2 0.071 0.034 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.045 0.074 0.069
aThe table reports the marginal eects of the dierent variables on telling a lie and the clustered robust standard errors
are given in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% condence levels, respectively.
protable truth-telling experience, observed truth-telling, protable truth-telling experience - normalized
and observed truth-telling - normalized. The rst one of these counts the number of periods during
the rst half that the subject lied in the role of a sender and earned 9 TL, the highest payo in the
two games.8 The second one counts the number of periods during the rst half of the game that the
subject saw a correct message in the role of a receiver. Since the role assignment was not balanced for
subjects during the rst and the second half of each game, we need normalized measures to account
for subject experience. Consequently, we constructed protable truth-telling experience - normalized
8Note that in the Regulated Game, we excluded the periods where the signal was sent by the computer.
16which is protable truth-telling experience divided by \total chances to lie in the rst half of the
game", and observed truth-telling - normalized which is observed truth-telling divided by \the number
of times the subject was a receiver in the rst half of the game". We also control for the gender of
the subjects. Regardless of the variable we use for measuring protable truth-telling experience, we
see that the more subjects benet from telling the truth, the more likely they will send correct signals
in the further periods during the Regulated Game with the eects being signicant at 1% level. This
eect does not exist in the Benchmark Game where the experience in the rst half of the game does
not seem to aect the propensity of truth-telling in the second half. It appears that telling a lie or
telling the truth remains as a random choice throughout the Benchmark Game rather than a strategy
shaped (to some extent) by previous experience.
Table 3: The dependent variable here is trust which is equal to 1 if a subject (as a receiver) trusted
the receiver's message and 0 otherwise, and it includes observations from the second half of the game,
only. The independent variables we use here are protable trust experience, observed trust, protable
trust experience - normalized and observed trust - normalized. The rst one of these is equal to the
number of times in the rst half of the game that the subject played as a receiver, trusted the sender's
message and obtained a high payo. The second one counts the number of times in the rst half of the
game that the subject played as a sender and her message was trusted by the receiver. The variable
protable trust experience - normalized is protable trust experience divided by \number of times the
subject was a receiver in the rst half of the game" and observed trust - normalized is observed trust
divided by \total chances to lie in the rst half of the game". Controlling for the gender eects, we
nd that protable experiences of trust in early periods and observing trust among others increases
the likelihood of trusting others later in the Regulated Game while only protable experiences of trust
has a signicant (but opposite) eect for the Benchmark Game. Interestingly, the receivers in our
Benchmark Game seem to have always made correct dynamic calculations so that the end-of-the-
game average of their trust experience was around the theoretical prediction of trusting the sender,
on the average, once in every two plays, irrespective from the trust experiences and observations they
had accumulated in the earlier parts of the game.
5 Concluding Remarks
A growing literature on experimental economics has established overcommunication in strategic trans-
mission games involving fully strategic agents with con
ictive preferences. In those games, the sender
of a strategic information is observed to tell the truth more often than predicted by the theoretical
17model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In this paper, we have studied whether this phenomenon is stable
with respect to the random intervention of an honest regulator in the transmission game. To this end,
we designed a Regulated Game, in addition to our Benchmark Game which we borrowed from the
earlier literature. This new game allowed a truthful regulator to submit the private information of a
strategic sender with a commonly known probability.
While the sequential equilibria of both the Benchmark Game and the Regulated Game predict
no information transmission, our results showed that a strategic sender exhibited excessive truth-
telling in both games. More interestingly, the size of excessive truth-telling by strategic senders was
much higher in the presence of random intervention. Besides, the average communication level by the
strategic and non-strategic senders was also excessively high. These ndings clearly show that the
recent literature experimentally invalidating the theoretical predictions is robust with respect to the
inclusion of a behavioral sender type in the information transmission game.
On the receiver end of our information transmission games, we observed excessive trust behavior.
More interestingly, the receivers seem to have correctly perceived in the Regulated Game the overco-
munication of strategic senders. Indeed, we found that the average trust level of receivers was 22%
higher than foreseen by the sequential equilibrium while the strategic senders' excessive truth-telling
exceeded the theoretically predicted level by 20%. From the perspective of economic policy, our results
may suggest that in principal-agent settings intervention pays to a honest regulator acting on behalf
of the informationally inferior agents.
Finally, we analysed the dynamic roots of excessive truth-telling and trust in the two strategic
games. Our regressions showed that under intervention the more a strategic sender found truth-telling
protable in the earlier rounds of experiments, the more likely she told the truth in the subsequent
rounds. In the Benchmark Game, however, the past experience of strategic senders did not have a
predictive power to explain their overcommunication in the future. We also showed that protable
experiences of trust in early periods as well as observing trust among other players increase the likeli-
hood of trust later in the Regulated Game, while we found an opposite eect of protable experiences
of trust for the Benchmark Game.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
We will rst nd the best response correspondences of the receiver and the strategic sender. At
information set H1 in Figure 2, the receiver observes that the message that has been sent is A, which
might have come from a strategic sender who could reveal his information truthfully or untruthfully,
18or from a behavioral sender who observed the actual table is A and had been restricted to send a
truthful message. Let the beliefs at information set H1 be dened as:
1 = p(actual table is A and sender is strategic jreceiver observed message A)
k1 = p(actual table is A and sender is behavioral jreceiver observed message A)
Then, the receiver's expected payo by choosing U is:
1 + k1 + (1   k1   1)x
On the other hand, if the receiver plays D, his expected payo is:
1x + k1x + (1   k1   1)
So, the best response correspondence of the receiver at information set H1 is given by:
R(U j A) 2
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
f1g if 1  1
2   k1
[0;1] if 1 = 1
2   k1
f0g if 1  1
2   k1
At information set H2, we dene the beliefs of the receiver as:
2 = p(actual table is A and sender is strategic jreceiver observed message B)
k2 = p(actual table is A and sender is behavioral jreceiver observed message B)
Thus, the receiver's expected payos from playing U and D, are as follows. If the receiver plays U,
his expected payo is:
2 + k2x + (1   k2   2)x
If the receiver plays D, his expected payo is:
2x + k2 + (1   k2   2)
Then, the best response correspondence of the receiver at information set H2 is given by:
R(U j B) 2
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
f1g if 2  1
2
[0;1] if 2 = 1
2
f0g if 2  1
2
19Now we nd the best response correspondence of the strategic sender who knows that the actual payo
table is A. The expected payo from sending the message A (telling the truth) is:
R(U j A)x + [1   R(U j A)]
The expected payo from sending the message B (revealing the information untruthfully) is:
R(U j B)x + [1   R(U j B)]
Thus, the best response correspondence of the sender who knows that the actual payo table is A
becomes:
S(A j A) 2
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
f1g if R(U j A)  R(U j B)
[0;1] if R(U j A) = R(U j B)
f0g if R(U j A)  R(U j B)
Similarly, we can nd the best response correspondence of the strategic sender who knows that the
actual payo table is B. The expected payo from sending the message A is
R(U j A) + [1   R(U j A)]x;
whereas the expected payo from sending the message B is
R(U j B) + [1   R(U j B)]x:
So, the best response correspondence of the sender who knows that the actual payo table is B
becomes:
S(A j B) 2
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
f1g if R(U j A)  R(U j B)
[0;1] if R(U j A) = R(U j B)
f0g if R(U j A)  R(U j B)
The beliefs 1 (that Nature chose table A and the sender was strategic given that the receiver has
observed message A) and k1 (that Nature chose table A and the sender was behavioral given that the
receiver has observed message A) are calculated as follows:
1 =
S(A j A)(1   )
1
2








S(A j A)(1   )
[S(A j A) + S(A j B)](1   ) + 
k1 =

 + (1   )[S(A j A) + S(A j B)]
20Similarly, the beliefs 2 (that Nature chose table A and the sender was strategic given that the receiver
has observed message B) and k2 (that Nature chose table A and the sender was behavioral given that
the receiver has observed message B) are given by:
2 =
S(B j A)(1   )
1
2








S(B j A)(1   )
[S(B j A) + S(B j B)](1   ) + 
k2 =

 + (1   )[S(B j A) + S(B j B)]
To complete the proof, we make the following three claims.
Claim 1. 1 = 1
2   k1 and 2 = 1
2 in any equilibrium.
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose for a contradiction that 1 > 1
2   k1. Then, by substituting 1   S(B j
A)  S(A j A) and 1 S(B j B)  S(A j B) in the denition of 1, we get that 2 < 1
2. With these
beliefs (1 > 1
2   k1 and 2 < 1
2), the best reply of the receiver is R(U j A) = 0 after observing the
message A and R(U j B) = 1 after observing the message B. In turn, the best reply of the strategic
sender is S(A j A) = 0 after learning that the actual payo table is A and S(A j B) = 1 after
learning that the actual payo table is B. Given the strategies of the sender, we calculate 1 = 0,
which contradicts with 1 > 1
2   k1.
Now, suppose that 1 < 1
2   k1. Then, by substituting 1   S(B j A)  S(A j A) and 1   S(B j
B)  S(A j B) in the denition of 1, we get that 2 > 1
2. With these beliefs (1 < 1
2   k1
and 2 > 1
2), the best reply of the receiver is R(U j A) = 1 after observing the message A and
R(U j B) = 0 after observing the message B. In turn, the best reply of the strategic sender is
S(A j A) = 1 after learning that the actual payo table is A and S(A j B) = 0 after learning that
the actual payo table is B. Given the strategies of the sender, we calculate 2 = 0, a contradiction.
Therefore, the only possibility is 1 = 1
2   k1, which necessitates 2 = 1
2.
Claim 2. R(U j A) = R(U j B) = p 2 [0;1]:
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose not. Then either R(U j A) > R(U j B) or vice versa. If R(U j A) >
R(U j B), then the best response of the sender is S(A j A) = 1 after learning that the payo table
is A and S(A j B) = 0 after learning that the payo table B, which results in 2 = 0, which is a
21contradiction by Claim 1. If, on the other hand, R(U j A) < R(U j B), we arrive to the contradiction
that 1 = 0. Thus, R(U j A) = R(U j B) = p 2 [0;1].
Given that R(U j A) = R(U j B) = p 2 [0;1], the best reply of the sender dictates that S(A j B)
and S(A j A) can be any mixed strategy.
Claim 3. In any sequential equilibrium of the Regulated Game, the strategic sender's strategies satisfy
S(B j A)   S(B j B) =

1   




Proof of Claim 3. For consistency of beliefs, the only possibility is 1 = 0:5   k1, which necessitates
2 = 0:5. Note that given that 2 = 0:5, S(B j A)   S(B j B) = =(1   ), which also implies
S(A j B)   S(A j A) = =(1   ).
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. 
Appendix B. Instructions (Regulated Game)9
Welcome!
Thank you for your participation. The aim of this study is to understand how people decide in certain situations.
From now on, talking to each other is prohibited. If you have a question please raise your hand. This way, everyone
will hear the question and the answer.
The experiment will be conducted on the computer and you will make all your decisions there. You will earn a
reward in the game that will be played during the experiment. This reward will depend on your decisions as well the
decisions of other participants. The reward and the participation fee will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
We start with the instructions.
In this experiment, you will play a game that will last for 50 rounds. Before the rst round, the system will divide
the participants to two groups of 6 people. These groups will stay the same throughout the experiment. A participant
in a given group will only play with participants from that group, but will not learn the identities of other participants
in the group.
Let us now describe the game on more detail. Please do not hesitate to ask questions.
At the beginning of each round, you will match with another participant from your group. In this matching, one
participant will be determined as `sender' and the other participant will be determined as `receiver'. All of you will play
25 times as a sender and 25 times as a receiver. At the end of the game all group members will have been matched with
each other equal number of times. So, you will play 5 times as a sender and 5 times as a receiver with each member in
the group. The order of matchings and role assignments are randomly determined.
9Instructions for the Benchmark Game have minor dierences and do not include the parts describing computer
system intervention to the message. We did not include the pictures referred in the text here since the experimental
software is built on S anches-Pag es and Vorsatz (2007) which already includes the screenshots of the software.
22At each round, after the matchings and the role assignments are completed, the system will choose one among the
A and B tables below. Each table is equally likely to be chosen by the system. The earnings in that round will depend
on the table chosen by the system and the action chosen by the receiver.
Table A Sender Receiver
Action U 9 1
Action D 1 9
Table B Sender Receiver
Action U 1 9
Action D 9 1
Sender's task:
At the beginning of each round, the sender will be informed about the table chosen by the system in that round. the
sender is the rst to make a decision in the game. She will tell the receiver which payo table is chosen by the system
(see picture 1). She is free to send correct or wrong message.
But, at some rounds, system will not allow the sender from sending a message and the receiver will be told the
correct table chosen by the system. The probability of this happening is 30%. During such rounds, the sender will
observe that the system is sending the message on behalf of her but will not be able to make a choice (see picture 2).
The receiver will not learn, during any of the rounds, whether the message is sent by the sender or the system.
Receiver's task:
The receiver will rst see the message sent to him (picture 3). On the screen that he observes this message, the receiver
will also be asked which table he believes is more likely to determine the earnings in that round.
On the next screen, the receiver will choose one among the actions U and D. (picture 4). On this screen, at the top,
he can see how earnings are determined in tables A and B. At the bottom of this, he can see the message he received
and the belief he stated on the previous screen.
After the receiver makes his choice, the earnings will be determined by the actual table chosen by the system and
the choice of the receiver.
At the end of each round, on the summary screen (picture 5 for the receiver and picture 6 for the sender) players
can see
- the table chosen by the system,
- the message received by the receiver,
- the action chosen by the receiver,
- the sender's earnings,
- the receiver's earnings.
Payments:
Based on your earnings in each round, we will calculate your average earning. You can see this on the summary table
located at the bottom of the screen. We will pay you twice the average of your earnings. In addition to this, you will
receive a participation fee of 5 TL. Nobody else, other than yourself, will be allowed to observe your earnings. You can
leave the room after you receive your payment.
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